Risk-Taking, Misalignment, and Systemic Harm
Excessive corporate risk-taking by systemically important firms is widely seen as one of the primary causes of the global financial crisis. In response, governments have issued an array of regulation to attempt to curb excessive risk-taking and prevent another crisis.
Many of these measures are designed to control excessive risktaking by aligning managerial and investor interests, implicitly assuming that the investors themselves would oppose excessively risky business ventures. These include, for example, requiring a systemically important firm to tie management compensation to the firm's long-term performance, or requiring a systemically important firm to maintain socalled contingent capital, in which debt securities convert into equity upon specified conditions. The assumption that investors themselves would oppose excessively risky business ventures is flawed, however.
Therefore financial regulation based on the assumption's validity is unreliable.
The assumption is flawed because what constitutes "excessive" risk-taking depends on the observer. Risk-taking is excessive from a given observer's standpoint if it has a negative expected value to that observer-i.e., the expected costs to that observer exceed the expected benefits. It is reasonable to assume that investors would oppose risky business ventures with a negative expected value to them. The flaw, however, is that systemically important firms can engage in risk-taking ventures that have a positive expected value to their investors but a negative expected value to the public. That is because much of the systemic harm from such a firm's failure would be externalized onto the public, including ordinary citizens impacted by an economic collapse, causing widespread poverty and unemployment.
Corporate governance law creates this misalignment by requiring managers of a firm to view the consequences of their firm's actions, and thus the expected value of corporate risk-taking, only from the standpoint of the firm and its investors (effectively stakeholders). That perspective ignores externalities caused by the actions.
Ordinarily this is sensible; managers could not feasibly govern if they had to take into account the myriad small externalities that result from corporate risk-taking. But risk-taking that causes the failure of a systemically important firm could trigger a domino-like collapse of other firms or markets, causing systemic externalities that severely damage the economy. 
I. REDESIGNING REGULATION
In making corporate decisions, managers currently have a duty to the firm and its investors. To reduce systemic externalities, they should also have a duty to society (a "public governance duty") not to engage their firms in excessive risk-taking that leads to those externalities. So long as it does not unduly weaken wealth-producing capacity (corporate wealth production being in the public interest), regulating governance in this way would help to align private and public interests.
Regulating Governance Works Better also for Financial Change
In the financial context, regulating governance also has another advantage over regulating substance. Regulating substance often depends on regulators precisely understanding the financial "architecture"-the particular design and structure of financial firms, markets, and other related institutions-at the time the regulation is promulgated. Because the financial architecture is constantly changing, that type of grounded regulation has value as long as it is updated as needed to adapt to those changes.
But ongoing financial monitoring and regulatory updating can be costly and is subject to political interference at each updating stage. As a result, financial regulation of substance usually lags financial innovation, causing unanticipated consequences and allowing innovations to escape regulatory scrutiny.
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Regulating governance, in contrast, can overcome that regulatory time lag. To fulfill their governance duties, the managers of a firm that is proposing to engage in a financially innovative but risky project must try to obtain the most current information about the innovation and its consequences.
II. TOWARDS REGULATORY ALIGNMENT: A PUBLIC GOVERNANCE DUTY
Next consider the theory and practicality of a public governance duty. Because only systemically important firms, by definition, could engage in risk-taking that leads to systemic externalities, such a duty should apply only to managers of those firms.
A. Situating a Public Governance Duty within Corporate
Governance Theory 4 This occurred in 2008, for example, when the pre-crisis financial regulatory framework, which assumed the dominance of bank-intermediated funding, failed to adequately address a collapsing financial system in which the majority of funding had become nonbank intermediated.
Except to the extent it intentionally limits shareholder primacy, a public governance duty would not be inconsistent with corporate governance legal theory. It should most clearly be consistent with the stakeholder model of governance, which considers the interests of everyone affected by a firm's actions to avoid anyone being unfairly exploited. The public, of course, is affected by a firm's risk-taking.
This model, however, adds little explanatory value because there is fundamental disagreement on the extent to which non-investor stakeholder interests should be taken into account, valued, and balanced with shareholder interests.
A public governance duty would, at first glance, appear to be inconsistent with the contractarian model of governance-that a firm is a "nexus of contracts" among private parties. After all, members of the public are not contracting parties. Contract law, however, does not limit its application to contracting parties. Government should be able to limit freedom of contracting when the contracting causes externalities.
The critical question is which externalities should count in limiting that freedom.
Even under contract law, there is no absolute answer to that question. But we need answer only a much more limited question:
Should systemic externalities count in limiting freedom of contract?
That question has already effectively been answered: systemic externalities not only harm the public, who cannot contract to protect themselves, but also cause much more harm than non-systemic This subjective approach would have at least three drawbacks, however. First, because the consequences of a systemic collapse can be devastating to the public, the decisionmaking process to mitigate that harm should be more transparent. Second, managers following a subjective approach may be subject to peer pressure to favor investor profitability over avoiding public harm-especially when, as I later argue, managers often have conflicts of interest that favor the firm's shareholders over the public. Third, although courts generally try to avoid second-guessing management decisions, even managers should want to follow an approach that provides an explicit safe harbor against litigation-at least if the approach is relatively ministerial.
Consider how to craft a possible ministerial safe-harbor objective approach, using the generic example of a systemically important firm engaging in a risky project that could be profitable. The expected private benefits would be the expected value of the project to the firm's investors (usually the shareholders). The expected public costs would be the expected value of the project's systemic costs. From a strict (Kaldor-Hicks) economic efficiency standpoint, the project would be efficient if its expected value to investors exceeds the expected value of its systemic costs. As a public policy matter, however, simple economic efficiency may be insufficient because the magnitude and harmful consequences of a systemic collapse, if it occurs, could be devastating.
When balancing the costs and benefits of activities that might pose great harm, policymakers normally apply a precautionary principle directing regulators to err on the side of safety. Applying that to our balancing, it may be appropriate (as Cass Sunstein has proposed in another context 10 ) to require "a margin of safety"-for example, requiring that the expected value to investors considerably exceeds the expected value of systemic costs-to demonstrate that a given risktaking activity is justified.
I'm not claiming that the foregoing approach to assessing and balancing costs and benefits is perfect. Even if imperfect, however, it should represent a step towards shaping corporate governance norms to begin to take the public into account. The business judgment rule arguably should apply differently in a public-governance-duty context because one of the rule's basic assumptions-that there be no conflict of interest-may be breached.
Enforcing a Public Governance
The interest of a manager who holds significant shares or interests in shares, or whose compensation or retention is dependent on share price, is aligned with the firm's shareholders, not with that of the public. To that extent, the manager would have a conflict of interest.
But how should the business judgment rule be modified without requiring courts to exercise inappropriate discretion or discouraging the best people from serving as managers? One approach would be to prevent conflicted managers who are grossly negligent-that is, who fail to use even slight care in assessing systemic harm to the publicfrom using the rule as a defense. Ch. 1996) (emphasis in original). Such conduct is interpreted to include a manager failing to take "steps in a good faith effort to prevent or remedy" such a violation. In re Caremark Int'l Inc. Derivative Litigation, 698 A.2d 959, 971 (Del. Ch. 1996) . A manager's failure to use even slight care when assessing systemic harm to the public under a legally mandated public governance duty would appear to be bad faith under those interpretations insurance, which indemnifies managers against personal liability.
Although D&O liability insurance is needed to incentivize good managers and also to help ensure that sufficient funds are available to properly incentivize private-action lawsuits, it might compromise the deterrent effect of imposing personal liability. Furthermore, because the magnitude of systemic harm is open ended, insurers may be reluctant to offer D&O insurance covering breaches of the public governance duty.
At least one possible solution to these concerns would be to specify a limit on the amount of the claim that could be imposed for breaching the public governance duty and, like a deductible, to require managers to be personally liable for some portion of that amount.
CONCLUSION
I have argued that corporate governance law should require some duty to the public in order to help mitigate systemic economic harm.
Even if imperfect, such a duty represents (as mentioned) an important step towards shaping corporate governance norms to begin to take the public into account.
